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PUTTING THE LAW OF IMPEACHMENT IN PERSPECTIVE 
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT' 
INTRODUCTION 
In his excellent paper, Professor Richard Pious has reminded us of some-
thing whose importance we cannot overemphasize-the popular law of im-
peachment. As Professor Pious explains, constitutional text, history, structure 
and precedent are all crucial for understanding the basic purposes of and pro-
cedures employed in the federal impeachment process.1 These conventional 
sources of constitutional decisions do not, however, tell the full story. Im-
peachment proceedings do not occur in a vacuum. It is not possible to appre-
ciate fully the dynamics of impeachment proceedings without understanding 
the historical, social and political contexts in which they have arisen. In other 
words, the direction, outcome and perceived legitimacy of any given im-
peachment proceeding depends a great deal upon the popular law of impeach-
ment. 
In this essay, my purpose is to supplement and to expand on Professor Pi-
ous' important study. Over the past decade, I have had several occasions to 
study in detail the background and history of the federal impeachment process. 
In this essay, I wish to share the results of these prior studies. These studies 
have the advantage of having been undertaken at times when the Congress was 
not in the midst of any ongoing impeachment proceedings. My focus in the 
past has not been on setting the record straight in any particular case, nor is it 
in the present circumstance on resolving whether the misconduct for which the 
House of Representatives impeached President Clinton-particularly perjury 
and making false statements to a grand jury-actually rises to the level of an 
impeachable offense. Instead, my focus has been to clarify what constitutional 
structure and history has to teach us generally about the process of impeach-
ment. These lessons in turn help to clarify the kinds of questions that members 
of Congress should ask and the kinds of factors members of Congress should 
take into consideration when trying to decide whether to impeach and remove 
'Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary. 
I. Richard Pious, Impeaching the President: The Intersection of Constitutional and Popu-
lar Law, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 859 (1999). 
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the President of the United States. 
As background, Part I identifies the ways in which the founders purposely 
tried to distinguish the federal impeachment process from its British counter-
part.2 Of particular importance were the founders' desires to narrow or restrict 
the range of both impeachable offenses and the persons who would be subject 
to impeachment. This narrowing is in sharp contrast to the British system in 
which there was no limit to either the kinds of people who could be impeached 
or the kinds of offenses for which the latter may have been impeached. 
Part II examines the likeliest meaning of the terms of art "other high 
crimes and misdemeanors" that provide the bases for federal impeachment.3 
The weight of authority, as most other scholars and commentators have found, 
is that these words constitute technical terms of art that refer to political 
crimes. For the most part, the founders did not regard political crimes as the 
functional equivalent of indictable crimes nor did they regard all indictable 
crimes as constituting impeachable offenses. Rather, they considered political 
crimes to consist of "great" and "dangerous" offenses committed by certain 
federal officials. Oftentimes, these offenses were further characterized as seri-
ous abuses of official power or serious breaches of the public trust. The foun-
ders also understood that these offenses might have been but were not neces-
sarily punishable in the courts. Indeed, many founders had the further 
understanding that the scope of impeachable offenses largely consisted of 
those misdeeds for which an impeachable official was not likely (for whatever 
reason) to be held liable at law. 
Given that the founders expected that the scope of impeachable offenses 
would work itself out over time on a case-by-case basis, I turn in Part III to 
consider the possible lessons that might be derived from trends or patterns in 
the Congress' past impeachment practices.4 
Six patterns are especially noteworthy. The first is that proof an impeach-
able official's commission of an indictable crime has tended to increase the 
odds of impeachment.5 This trend poses a problem of constitutional dimension 
because it blurs the lines that the framers tried to draw between criminal and 
impeachable offenses. 
The second pattern is that members of Congress, particularly in the Senate, 
have agreed with the view that impeachable offenses are not necessarily in-
dictable crimes but rather political crimes in which the critical elements are se-
rious injury to the republic or the constitutional system. 6 
The third is the relatively widespread recognition of the paradigmatic case 
2. See infra notes 11-50 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 51-94 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 95-124 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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for impeachment as being based on the abuse of power.7 The three articles of 
impeachment approved by the House Judiciary Committee against President 
Richard Nixon have come to symbolize this paradigm. The great majority of 
impeachments brought by the House and convictions by the Senate approxi-
mate this paradigmatic case, for all of these cases, with the possible exception 
of one or two, involve the serious misuse of office or official prerogatives or 
breaches of the public trusts held. 
The fourth trend is based on the recognition of some legitimate impeach-
ment actions falling outside of the paradigmatic case.8 The latter category, best 
symbolized by the Claiborne decision, is that there may be some kinds of mis-
conduct in which an impeachable official might engage that are so outrageous 
and thoroughly incompatible with an official's status or responsibilities that 
they effectively disable a person from being able to continue to function at all 
in his or her present office. In such a case, Congress has no choice but to im-
peach and remove an official who has so behaved. 
The fifth conceivable trend is the relatively widespread recognition in 
Congress over the years (consistent with the constitutional structure) that im-
peachment is not the only means available to the House and/or the Senate to 
express its disapproval of an impeachable official's misconduct.9 In other 
words, censure-consisting of a resolution passed by one or both houses of 
Congress that is highly critical of an impeachable official's conduct-is a con-
stitutionally acceptable alternative (or, for that matter, supplement) to im-
peachment. 
The final pattern is that members of the House and, particularly, the Senate 
have recognized in the course of c;lebating impeachment that their impeach-
ment judgments are sui generis. 10 Unlike decisions about legislative matters, 
congressional impeachment decisions are not subject to presidential review or 
judicial review. Instead, impeachment judgments are, for all intents and pur-
poses, final. Their legitimacy turns on the judgment of history. Consequently, 
in rendering decisions on impeachment matters, members of Congress gener-
ally have had to consider whether their decisions to impeach (or to forego im-
peachment) can withstand the test of time. Members of Congress have appre-
ciated that their decisions constitute precedents in the field of impeachment, 
and these precedents have had a significant impact on the balance of power 
between the Congress and the other branches (whose officials have been the 
subject of impeachment actions). In the final analysis, the critical questions 
are structural and historical. The structural questions have to do with the de-
gree to which impeachments decisions are consistent with or alter basic sepa-
7. See infra notes 97-109 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra note 11 0 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 111-122 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. 
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ration of powers, while the historical questions have to do with whether subse-
quent generations will largely agree that impeachment decisions were made on 
a non-partisan basis. 
I. 
The discussions of the delegates to the constitutional convention and state 
ratifying conventions provide some important background for appreciating the 
distinctive features of the federal impeachment process. The founders wanted 
to distinguish the impeachment power set forth in the U.S. Constitution from 
the British practice in at least eight important ways. First, the founders limited 
impeachment only to "[t]he President, Vice-President and all civil officers of 
the United States,"11 whereas in England at the time of the founding of Re-
public anyone (except for a member of the royal family) could be impeachedP 
Second, the delegates to the constitutional convention tried to narrow the range 
of impeachable offense for public officeholders to "treason, bribery, and other 
high crimes or misdemeanors,'' 13 while the English Parliament had always re-
fused to constrain its jurisdiction over impeachments by restrictively defining 
impeachable offenses. 14 Third, whereas the English House of Lords could 
convict upon a bare majority, 15 the delegates to the constitutional convention 
agreed that in an impeachment trial held in the Senate "no Person shall be 
convicted [and removed from office] without the Concurrence of two thirds of 
the Members present."16 Fourth, the House of Lords could order any punish-
ment upon conviction, 17 but the delegates limited the punishments in the fed-
eral impeachment process "to removal from Office, and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any Office or honor, Trust or Profit under the United 
States ... " 18 Fifth, the King could pardon any person after an impeachment 
conviction, 19 but the delegates expressly prohibited the President from exer-
cising such power in the Constitution.20 Sixth, the founders provided that the 
President could be impeached,21 whereas the King of England could not be 
II. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
12. 15 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 1061, 1064 (DavidS. Gar-
land & Lucius P. McGehee eds., 1900)[hereinafter AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW). 
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, §4. 
14. 15 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW I 066. 
15. /d. at 1071. 
16. U.S. CONST. art. I., §3, cl.6. 
17. 15 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 1072. 
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, §3, cl.7. 
19. 15 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 1072. 
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl.l. 
21. /d. at art. II, § 4. 
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impeached. 22 Seventh, impeachment proceedings in England were considered 
to be criminal,23 while the Constitution separates criminal and impeachment 
proceedings.24 Lastly, the British provided for the removal of their judges by 
several means, whereas the Constitution provides impeachment as the sole po-
litical means of judicial removal.25 
Of these distinctive features, the one of greatest contemporary concern is 
the founders' choice of the words-"treason, bribery, and other high crimes or 
misdemeanors"-for delineating and narrowing the scope of the federal im-
peachment process. The founders did not discuss the meaning of "other high 
crimes or misdemeanors" extensively, certainly not in any way that defini-
tively resolves the precise meanings of those terms. Nevertheless, the context 
and content of the founders' principal discussions about the phrase "other high 
crimes or misdemeanors" provide an important backdrop to contemporary ef-
forts to understand the meaning of the phrase. 
Throughout the early debates in the constitutional convention on the scope 
of impeachable offenses, every speaker agreed that certain high-ranking offi-
cials of the new national government should not have immunity from prosecu-
tion for common law crimes, such as treason and murder. 26 Many delegates 
also envisioned a body of offenses for which these federal officials could be 
impeached. They figured that clarifying this body of offenses was important 
for two reasons-the first was to narrow the bases for which people could be 
impeached in the United States (in contrast to the unbounded system in Eng-
land), and the second was to clarify the grounds for which people could be im-
peached and removed. 
Early in the convention's proceedings, several delegates referred to "mal-" 
and "corrupt administration," "neglect of duty" and "misconduct in office" as 
the only impeachable offenses and maintained that common law crimes such 
as treason and bribery were to be heard in the courts of law.27 Some delegates 
notably William Paterson, Edmund Randolph, James Wilson and George Ma-
son, argued that the federal impeachment process should apply to misuse of 
22. 15 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 1064. 
23. /d. at I 062. 
24. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and its 
Alternatives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1, 23 (1989). 
25. See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 82-102 (1996). The founders also provided a 
couple of other special protections in the Senate; they required that "[w]hen sitting for .th[e] Pur-
pose [of trying impeachments, senators] shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of 
the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside ... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
26. 1 JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH 
FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 48(Gaillard Hunt & James 
Brown Scott eds., 1987)[hereinafter DEBATES]. 
27. !d. 
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official power in accordance with their respective state constitutions and expe-
riences?8 As late as August 20, 1787, the Committee of Detail reported that 
federal officials "shall be liable to impeachment and removal from office for 
neglect of duty, malversation, or corruption." 29 
Yet, in its report on September 4, the Committee of Eleven proposed that 
the grounds for conviction and removal of the President should be limited to 
"treason or bribery."30 On September 8, George Mason opened the conven-
tion's discussion on this latter proposal by questioning the wisdom of limiting 
impeachment to those two offenses. He argued that "[t]reason as defined in 
the Constitution [would] not reach many great and dangerous offences." 31 He 
used as an example of such subversion the contemporaneous English im-
peachment of Governor Warren Hastings of the East India Company, whose 
trial was based in part not upon specific criminal acts but rather upon the dan-
gers presented to the government by his wielding of virtually absolute power 
within the Indian colony. Mason was concerned that "[a]ttempts to subvert the 
Constitution may not be Treason as ... defined," and that, since "bills of at-
tainder ... are forbidden, ... it is the more necessary to extend the power of 
impeachments."32 Mason, therefore, moved to add the term 
"maladministration" to permit impeachment upon less conventionally defined 
common law offenses.33 Elbridge Gerry seconded the motion.34 James Madi-
son, without taking issue with either the appropriateness of including such 
subversion or the need to expand the standard to include such potentially non-
criminal wrongs, responded that "[s]o vague a term will be equivalent to a ten-
ure during pleasure of the Senate."35 Recalling an earlier debate on June 20, in 
which he had asked for more "enumerated and defined" impeachable offenses, 
Governeur Morris agreed with Madison. 36 Mason thereupon withdrew his 
motion and substituted "bribery and other high crimes or misdemeanors 
against the States," which Mason apparently understood as including malad-
ministration. 37 Without further comment, the motion was approved by a vote 
of eight to three. 38 -
The convention, again without discussion, later agreed to replace the word 
28. /d. 
29. 2 id. at 429. 
30. !d. at 508. 
31. 2 DEBATES 535. 
32. /d. 
33. /d. 
34. !d. 
35. !d. 
36. 2 DEBATES 535. 
37. !d. 
38. /d. 
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"State" with the words "United States."39 The Committee of Style and Ar-
rangement, which was respo~sible for reworking the resolutions without sub-
stantive change, eliminated the phrase "against the United States," presumably 
because it was thought to be redundant or superfluous. The convention ac-
cepted the shortened phrase without any further debate on its meaning. 
Subsequently, the most substantial discussion of the scope of impeachable 
offenses, besides those in The Federalist Papers (discussed in the section be-
low), occurred in the ratification conventions in North Carolina· and Virginia. 
For instance, in the North Carolina ratifying convention, James Iredell, who 
would later serve as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court, called atten-
tion to the complexity, if not impossibility, of defining the scope of impeach-
able offenses any more precisely than to acknowledge that they would involve 
serious injustices to the federal government. He understood impeachment as 
having been "calculated to bring [great offenders] to punishment for crime 
which it is not easy to describe, but which every one must be convinced is a 
high crime and misdemeanor against government. [T]he occasion for its exer-
cise will arise from acts of great injury to the community."40 As examples of 
impeachable offenses, he suggested that the "president must certainly be pun-
ishable for giving false information to the Senate" and that "the president 
would be liable to impeachments [if] he had received a bribe or had acted from 
some corrupt motive or other."41 He warned, though, that the purpose of im-
peachment was not to punish a president for "want of judgment" but rather to 
hold him responsible for being a "villain" and "willfully abusing his trust.'.42 
Governor Johnston. who would later become North Carolina's first U.S. sena-
tor, agreed that "impeachment ... is a mode of trial pointed out for great mis-
demeanors against the public."43 
In the Virginia convention, several speakers argued that impeachable of-
fenses were not limited to indictable crimes. For instance, James Madison ar-
gued that, if the president were to summon only a small number of states in or-
der to try to secure ratification of a treaty that hurt the interests of the other 
unrepresented states, "he would be impeached and convicted, as a majority of 
the states would be affected by his misdemeanor.'.44 Madison suggested fur-
ther that, "if the president be connected, in any suspicious manner with any 
person, and there be grounds to believe that he will shelter him," the president 
may be impeached.45 George Nicholas agreed that a president could be im-
39. !d. at 536. 
40. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 113 (J. Elliot ed., 1854).[hereinafter STATE DEBATES] 
41. !d. at 126. 
42. /d. 
43. /d. at 48. 
44. 3 id. at 500. 
45. 3 STATE DEBATES 498. 
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peached for a nonindictable offense. Edmund Randolph explained that "[i]n 
England, those subjects which produce impeachments are not opinions ... It 
would be impossible to discover whether the error of the opinion resulted from 
a willful mistake of the heart, or an involuntary fault of the head.'.46 He 
stressed that only the former constituted an impeachable offense. He insisted 
that no one should be impeached for "an opinion.'.47 
In the decade following ratification, the federal impeachment process re-
mained a subject of some debate and concern. For instance, in the First Con-
gress, then-Representative James Madison tried to calm the fears of some of 
his colleagues about possible presidential abuse of authority to remove execu-
tive officials by suggesting that the President "will be impeachable by the 
House before the Senate for such an act of maladministration; for I contend 
that the wanton removal of meritorious officers would subject him to im-
peachment and removal from [office].''48 Although one could construe Madi-
son's comment as meretricious because it supported a position he had taken in 
a partisan debate rather than as a framer (and because it arguably conflicted 
with his objection in the constitutional convention to making 
"maladministration" a basis for impeachment), Madison's comment is consis-
tent with the stance he took in the Virginia ratifying convention to support 
presidential impeachment for nonindictable abuses of power. 
Immediately following his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1790, 
James Wilson gave a series of lectures as a professor of law at the College of 
Philadelphia to clarify the foundations of the American Constitution. In these 
talks, given in 1790-91 but published posthumously, Justice Wilson described 
the essential character of impeachments as "proceedings of a political na-
ture ... confined to political characters, to political crimes and misdemeanors, 
and to political punishments.''49 He emphasized that the founders believed that 
"[i]mpeachments, and offenses impeachable, [did not] come ... within the 
scope of ordinary jurisprudence. They are founded on different principles; are 
governed by different maxims; and are directed to different objects: for this 
reason, the trial and punishment of an offence on an impeachment, is no bar to 
a trial and punishment of the same offence at common law.'' 50 
II. 
The relatively few comments made about the meaning of "other high 
46. /d. at 401. 
47. /d. 
48. 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 235 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland eds., 1789). 
49. James Wilson, Lectures on the Law, No. JJ, Comparison of the Constitution of the 
United States with that of Great Britain, in I THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 382, 426 (Robert 
McCloskey ed., 1987). 
50. /d. at 408. 
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crimes and misdemeanors" by the founders in the constitutional and state rati-
fying conventions do not definitively clarify the scope of impeachable of-
fenses. The reason that this is so is. not just because the founders failed to dis-
cuss the topic extensively or to anticipate all of the likely issues or cases that 
would arise in this area. The reason is that in choosing to make "other high 
crimes or misdemeanors" the basis for impeachable offenses, the founders 
chose terms of art that referred to a general category of offenses, the specific 
contents of which have to be worked out over time on a case-by-case basis. 
The great majority of commentators who have closely examined the likely 
meaning of the constitutional phrase "other high crimes or misdemeanors," in-
cluding, among others, Justice James Wilson~51 Justice Joseph Story,52 Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes,53 Justice Arthur Goldberg,54 Charles Black,55 
Raoul Berger,56 George Curtis,57 Arthur Bestor,58 Paul Fenton,59 Peter Hoffer 
and N.E.H. Hull,60 John Feerick,61 and John Labovitz (a former staff member 
of the House Judiciary Committee investigating President Nixon),62 have 
reached the same conclusion-that the phrase "other high crimes and misde-
meanors" consists of technical terms of art referring to "political crimes." 
They also have agreed that "political crimes" had a special meaning in the 
eighteenth century; "political crimes" were not necessaril~ indictable crimes. 
Instead, "political crimes" consisted of the kinds of abuses of power or injuries 
to the republic that could only be committed by public officials by virtue of the 
public offices they held. Although the concept of "political crimes" uses the 
term "crimes," it did not necessarily include all indictable offenses. Nor were 
all indictable offenses political crimes. 
To appreciate what would constitute "political crimes," one needs to go 
back to the British impeachment practices from which the founders drew the 
language "other high crimes and misdemeanors" and thus the concept of 
51. See id. 
52. JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, at 
269-87 (1987). 
53. CHARLES E. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 19 (1928). 
54. Art~ur J. Goldberg, The Question of Impeachment, I HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 5, 6 
(1974). 
55. CHARLES L. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 35, 39-40 (1974). 
56. RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 58 (1974). 
57. GEORGE T. CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 260-61 ( 197 4 ). 
58. See Arthur Bestor, Impeachment (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1974)), 49 WASH. L. REV. 255, 264-66 (1973). 
59. Paul S. Fenton, The Scope of the Impeachment Power, 65 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 726 
(1971). 
60. PETER HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805 101 (1984). 
61. John Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional Provisions, 39 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 47-58 (1970). 
62. JOHN LABOVITV, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 26-89, 108-31 (1978). 
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"political crimes." In the English experience prior to the drafting and ratifica-
tion of the Constitution, impeachment was primarily a political proceeding, 
and impeachable offenses were regarded as "political crimes." For instance, 
Raoul Berger observed in his influential study of the impeachment process that 
the English practice treated "[h]igh crimes and misdemeanors [as] a category 
of political crimes against the state."63 Berger supported this observation with 
quotations from relevant periods in which the speakers use terms equivalent to 
"political" and "against the state" to identify the distinguishing characteristics 
of an impeachable event.64 In England, the critical element of injury in an im-
peachable offense had been injury to the state.65 The eminent legal historian, 
Blackstone, traced this peculiarity to the ancient law of treason, which distin-
guished "high" treason, which was disloyalty against some superior, from 
"petit" treason, which was disloyalty to an equal or an inferior. 66 The late Pro-
fessor Arthur Bestor explained further that "[t]his element of injury to the 
commonwealth-that is, to the state and to its constitution-was historically 
the criterion for distinguishing a 'high' crime or misdemeanor from an ordi-
nary one."67 In summary, the English experience reveals that there was: 
[A] difference of degree, not a difference of kind, separat[ing] 'high' treason 
from other 'high' crimes and misdemeanors [and that] [t]he common element 
in [English impeachment proceedings] was [the] injury done to the state and its 
constitution, whereas among the particular offenses producing such injury 
some might rank as treasons, some as felonies and some as misdemeanors, 
among which might be included various offenses that in other contexts would 
fall short of actual criminality.68 
In addition, those delegates in the constitutional and state ratifying con-
ventions who supported the federal Constitution seemed to have a shared un-
63. See BERGER, supra note 56, at 61 (emphasis in original). 
64. /d. at 59-61. 
65. Bestor, supra note 58, at 264. 
66. See id. at 264 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENT ARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
75 ( 1765-69). Blackstone commented: 
/d. 
Treason ... in its very name (which is borrowed from the French) imports a betraying, 
treachery, or breach of faith ... [T]reason is ... a general appellation, made use of by the 
law, to denote ... that accumulation of guilt which arises whenever a superior reposes a 
confidence in a subject or inferior, ... and the inferior ... so forgets the obligations of 
duty, subjection, and allegiance, as to destroy the life of any such superior or lord .... 
[T]herefore for a wife to kill her lord or husband, a servant his lord or master, and an ec-
clesiastic his lord or ordinary; these, being breaches of the lower allegiance, of private and 
domestic faith, are denominated petit treasons. But when disloyalty so rears it's [sic] 
crest, as to attack even majesty itself, it is called by way of eminent distinction high trea-
son, alta proditio; being equivalent to the crimen laesae majestatis of the Romans. 
67. Bestor, supra note 58, at 263-64. 
68. /d. at 265. 
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derstanding of impeachment as a political proceeding and impeachable of-
fenses as essentially "political crimes."69 The delegates at the constitutional 
convention were intimately-familiar with impeachment in colonial America, 
which, like impeachment in England, had basically been a political proceed-
ing. Although the debates in the convention primarily focused on the offenses 
for which the President could be impeached and removed, there was general 
agreement that the President could be impeached only for so-called "great" of-
fenses.70 Moreover, the majority of examples given throughout the convention 
debates about the scope of impeachable offenses, such as Madison's prefer-
ence for the phrase "other high crimes and misdemeanors" because it encom-
passed attempts to subvert the Constitution, confirm that impeachable offenses 
primarily consisted of abuses of power that injured the state (and thus were not 
necessarily limited to indictable offenses). Neither the debates nor the relevant 
constitutional language eventually adopted, however, identify the specific of-
fenses that constitute impeachable abuses against the state. 
The ratification campaign further supports the conclusion that "other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors" were not limited to indictable offenses, but rather 
included great offenses against the federal government. For example, dele-
gates to state ratification conventions often referred to impeachable offenses as 
"great" offenses (as opposed to common law crimes), and they frequently 
spoke of how impeachment should lie if the official '"deviates from his 
duty"'71 or if he "'dare[s] to abuse the powers vested in him by the people.".n 
In Federalist No. 65, Alexander Hamilton echoed such sentiments, ob-
serving: 
The subject [of the Senate's] jurisdiction [in an impeachment trial] are those offenses 
which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or 
violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be 
·denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the soci-
ety itself."73 Believing it unwise to submit the impeachment decision to the Supreme 
Court because of "the nature of the proceeding,"74 Hamilton argued the impeachment 
court could not be "tied down" by strict rules, "either in the delineation of the offense by 
the prosecutors [the House of Representatives] or in the construction of it by the judges 
[the Senate]."75 
In short, Hamilton too believed that impeachable offenses comprised a unique 
set of transgressions that defied neat delineation. 
69. See id. at 266. 
70. See BERGER, supra note 56, at 88 (observing that "James Iredell, later a Supreme Court 
Justice, told the North Carolina convention [during the ratification campaign] that the 'occasion 
for its exercise [impeachment] will arise from acts of great injury to the community'"). 
71. 4 STATE DEBATES 47. 
72. /d. 
73. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton)(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 ). 
74. /d. at 398. 
75. /d. 
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Both Justices James Wilson and Joseph Story expressed agreement with 
Hamilton's understanding of impeachable offenses as political crimes. In his 
lectures on the new Constitution given immediately after his appointment to 
the Supreme Court, Justice Wilson referred to impeachments as involving, in-
ter alia, "political crimes and misdemeanors."76 Justice Wilson understood the 
term "high" describing "Crimes and Misdemeanors" to mean "political," 
while the latter term referred to bad conduct against the state?7 Similarly, 
Justice Joseph Story recognized the unique political nature of impeachable of-
fenses: 
The jurisdiction is to be exercised over offenses, which are committed by pub-
lic men in violation of their public trust and duties. Those ... duties are, in 
many cases, political. . . . Strictly speaking, then, the power partakes of a po-
litical character, as it respects injuries to the society in its political character?8 
Justice Story also viewed the penalties of removal and disqualification as 
"limiting the punishment to such modes of redress, as are peculiarly fit for a 
political tribunal to administer, and as will secure the public against political 
injuries."79 Justice Story understood "political injuries" to be "[s]uch kind of 
misdeeds ... as peculiarly injure the commonwealth by the abuse of high of-
fices of trust. "80 
In much the same manner as Hamilton, Justice Story understood that the 
framers proceeded as if there would be a federal common law on crimes from 
which future Congresses could draw the specific or particular offenses for 
which certain federal officials may be impeached and removed from office. 
Justice Story explained that "no previous statute is necessary to authorize an 
impeachment for any official misconduct."81 Nor, in Justice Story's view, 
could such a statute ever be drafted because "political offenses are of so vari-
ous and complex a character, so utterly incapable of being defined, or classi-
fied, that the task of positive legislation would be impracticable, if it were not 
almost absurd to attempt it."82 The implicit understanding shared by both 
Hamilton and Justice Story was that subsequent generations would have to de-
fine on a case-by-case basis the political crimes serving. as contemporary im-
peachable offenses. 
The remaining problem is how to identify the nonindictable offenses for 
which certain high-level government officials may be impeached. This task is 
76. Wilson, supra note 49, at 426. 
77. /d. 
78. STORY, supra note 52, at 272-73. 
79. /d. at 290. 
80. Bestor, supra note 58, at 263 (quoting JOSOPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION 256 (1833)). 
81. STORY, supra note 52, at 288. 
82. /d. at 287 (citations omitted). 
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critical for providing notice to impeachable officials as to the conditions of, 
and for narrowing in some meaningful fashion, the grounds for their removal. 
The likeliest places to look: for guidance are to the framers' debates or 
authoritative commentary on the ·meaning of the relevan.t constitutional lan-
guage (as reflected above) and historical practices. The latter do provide some 
insight into the answer to this challenge. First, it is noteworthy that of the 
sixteen men impeached by the House of Representatives, only five were im-
peached primarily or solely on grounds strictly constituting a criminal offense: 
Secretary of War William Belknap (charged with accepting bribes); Harry 
Claiborne (charged with willfully making false tax statements); Alcee Hastings 
(charged with conspiring to solicit a bribe ~d perjury); Walter Nixon (charged 
with perjury); and Bill Clinton (for perjury and obstruction of justice). One of 
these five-Alcee Hastings-had been formally acquitted of bribery prior to 
his impeachment. The House's articles of impeachment against the other 
eleven include misuses of power that were not indictable federal offenses at 
the time they were approved. 
Of the seven men ~ho have been convicted and removed from office by 
the Senate, four were convicted and removed from office on the basis of non-
indictable offenses. These four officials included Judge John Pickering 
(convicted and removed.for public drunkenness and blasphemy);83 Judge West 
H. Humphreys (convicted and removed by the Senate for having publicly ad-
vocated that Tennessee secede from the Union, organizing armed rebellion 
against the United States, accepting a judicial commission from the Confeder-
ate Government, holding court pursuant to that commission and failing to ful-
fill his duties as a U.S. District Judge);84 Judge Robert Archbald (convicted, 
removed and disqua~ified by the Senate for obtaining contracts for himself 
from persons appearing before his court and others and for adjudicating cases 
in which he had a financial interest or received payment--offenses for which, 
as the Chairman of the House Impeachment Committee at the time conceded, 
no criminal charges could be ~rought);85 and Judge Halsted Ritter (who was 
convicted and removed from office on the sole basis that he had brought "his 
court into scandal and disrepute, to the prejudice of said court and public con-
fidence in the administration of justice therein, and to the prejudice of public 
respect for and confidence in the federal judiciary[]"). 86 · 
Of the remaining three officials who were convicted and removed from of-
fice by the Senate, all three were convicted and removed from office on the 
basis of indictable crimes.87 These three official~ are Harry Claiborne (income 
83. 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 319-22 (1804). 
84. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2949-50 (1862). 
85. 48 CONG. REC. 8910 (1912). 
86. 80 CONG. REC. 5606 (1936). 
87. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL, REPORT OF THE 
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tax invasion), Alcee Hastings (bribery and perjury) and Walter Nixon (making 
false statements to a grand jury).88 Prior to their impeachments and removals 
from office, two of these judges-Claiborne and Nixon-had been indicted, 
convicted in federal court, and exhausted their criminal appeaH;.89. · 
Given that certain federal officials may be impeached and removed from 
office for committing serious abuses against the state and that these abuses 
have not always been, nor necessarily should be, confined to indictable of-
fenses, the persistent challenge has been to find contemporary analogues to the 
abuses against the state that authorities such as Hamilton and Justices Wilson 
and Story viewed as suitable grounds for impeachment. On the one hand, 
these abuses may be reflected in certain statutory crimes. (The Constitution 
itself defines treason as "consist[ing] only in levying Wat against the [United 
States], or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Cornfort.")90 At 
least one federal criminal statute-the bribery statute91-codifies an impeach-
able offense because bribery is expressly designated as such in the Constitu-
tion. Violations of other federal criminal statutes may also reflect abuses 
against the state sufficient to subject the perpetrator to impeachment, insofar as 
the offenses involved demonstrate willful misconduct and serious lack of 
judgment and respect for the law in the course of performing one's duties. In 
other words, it is conceivable there are certain statutory crimes that, if com-
mitted by public officials, reflect such abuses of the privileges of their offices, 
breaches of the public trust, disregard for the welfare of the state and disre-
spect or disdain for the constitutional system, the officials who have commit-
ted such misconduct have effectively disabled themselves from continuing in 
office and thus merit impeachment and removal. 
On the other hand, not all statutory crimes demonstrate complete unfitness 
for office. For example, a President's technical violation of a law making jay-
walking or speeding a crime "obviously would not be an adequate basis for 
presidential impeachment and removal."92 Moreover, it is equally obvious that 
some non-criminal activities may constitute impeachable offenses. As Profes-
NAT'L COMM'N ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 30 (1993) [hereinafter JUDICIAL 
REMOVAL]. 
88. !d. 
89. See generally Bernard D. Reams, Jr. & Carol J. Gray, THE CONGRESSIONAL IM-
PEACHMENT PROCESS AND THE JUDICIARY: DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS ON THE REMOVAL OF 
FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGE HARRY E. CLAIBORNE (1987) (compiling all government documents 
relating to Judge Claiborne's impeachment proceedings). STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, 
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, l05th CONG., REPORT ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR 
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT: MODERN PRECEDENTS 5-14 (Comm. Print 1998) (discussing im-
peachment cases since 1973)[hereinafter MODERN PRECEDENTS]. 
90. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
91. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994). 
92. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 294 ( 1988). 
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sor Laurence Tribe observed, "[a] deliberate presidential decision to emascu-
late our national defenses or to conduct a private war in circumvention of the 
Constitution would probably violate no .criminal code,"93 but would probably 
constitute a nonindictable, ir~peachable offense. The full range of such politi-
cal crimes defies further specification because it rests on the circumstances 
under which the offenses have occurred (including the actor, the forum, the 
scope of the officer's official duties and the nature and significance of the of-
fensive act), alternative remedies and the collective political judgment of Con-
gress.94 
III. 
The founders believed that political crimes would be clarified over time on 
a case-by-case basis. In other words, the founders figured that while the stan-
dard for impeachment would remain constant over time--consisting of 
whether someone had seriously injured the republic or the constitutional sys-
tem-it would be applied on a case-by-case basis to determine whether it had 
been met in any given circumstance. Consequently, congressional practices 
are important because they help to illuminate Congress' deliberate judgments 
over the past two centuries on what constitutes an impeachable offense. Given 
the likelihood that Congress' judgments on impeachment are largely, if not 
wholly immune to presidential and judicial review, these judgments take on 
even more importance. For all practical purposes, Congress' decisions on im-
peachment constitute the final word on the scope of the federal impeachment 
power. Congress thus gives extra special consideration to its impeachment de-
cisions. Indeed, a survey of the sixteen formal impeachments brought by the 
House and the seven convictions and six acquittals rendered by the Senate in-
93. Id. 
94. Constitutional safeguards apply to the impeachment process and should circumscribe 
congressional efforts to define political crimes. The Constitution includes several guarantees to 
ensure that Congress will deliberate carefully prior to making any judgments in an impeachment 
proceeding: (I) when the Senate sits as a court of impeachment, "they shall be on Oath or Af-
firmation," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; (2) at least two-thirds of the Senators present must fa-
vor conviction in order for the impeachment to be successful, see id.; and (3) in the special case 
of presidential removal, the Chief Justice must preside so that the Vice-President, who otherwise 
normally presides, is spared from having to oversee the impeachment trial of the one person who 
stands between him and the presidency. See id. 
Two other safeguards are political in nature. First; members of Congress seeking reelection 
have a political incentive to avoid any abuse of the impeachment power. The knowledge that 
they may have to account to their constituency may lead them to deliberate cautiously on im-
peachment questions. Second, the cumbersome nature of the impeachment process makes it dif-
ficult for a faction guided by base political motives to impeach and remove someone from office. 
Thus, these structural and political safeguards help to ensure that, as a practical matter, serious 
abuse of power and serious injury to the Republic are the prerequisites for Congress' finding im-
peachable offenses. 
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dicates six noteworthy patterns. 
A. The Relationship Between Criminal Actions and Impeachment 
Proceedings 
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I have already alluded to the fact that the House has impeached and the 
Senate has removed people for offenses that have (at least technically) not 
constituted indictable crimes: There is, however, a related tendency for the 
Senate to convict on the basis of indictable crimes or at least to find conviction 
easier to effect if an indictable offense were involved. Moreover, in the 1980s, 
the Senate convicted Judges Claiborne, Hastings and Nixon on the basis of in-
dictable offenses.95 The convictions of Claiborne· and Nixon demonstrate that 
the Congress is especially likely to impeach and remove officials who have 
been previously convicted of felonies in court. Indeed, the criminal convic-
tions of Claiborne and Nixon (and the Judicial Council's finding that Hastings 
had engaged in criminal rilisconduct) clearly put pressure on Congress to bring 
impeachment actions against these officials. That such convictions can bring 
such pressure is a m~tter of concern to many members of Congress ~nd schol-
ars because it indicates that under certain circumstances criminal prosecutors 
can drive the impeachment process. Since the framers envisioned that criminal 
and impeachment proceedings are separate and that the discretions for initiat-
ing each belong to authorities in different branches, it is important for mem-
bers of Congress to ensure that crimjnal prosecutors do not rob nor unduly in-
fluence the Congress' constitutional discretion to .initiate or conduct 
impeachment actions on the grounds that its members think are appr9priate. 
B. The Relative Consensus on the Scope of Impeachable Offenses 
The second pattern consists of the most common characterizations of im-
peachable offenses made in the constitutional and state ratifying conventions 
and in Congress (particularly in the Senate) as consisting of serious abuse of 
power, serious breach of the public trust and serious injury to the republic or to 
the constitutional system. Given the division of impeachment authority be-
tween the House and the Senate, the Senate has had the opportunity to review 
House decisions on what constitutes an impeachable offense and concluded 
that impeachable offenses do not include errors of judgment or policy differ-
ences.96 Instead, the seven removal decisions made by the Senate have in 
common the judgment that impeachable offenses consist of serious breaches of 
the public trust or misconduct that are so incompatible with the office that 
conviction and removal by the Senate are required. 
95. See JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE, supra note 87, at 30. 
96. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 3, cl. 6. J. STORY, supra note 52, at 270-71. 
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C. The Relative Consensus on the Paradigm for Presidential Impeachment 
The third trend is the apparent recognition among constitutional scholars 
and historians (if not also by members of Congress) that there may be a para-
digmatic case for impeachment consisting of the abuse of power. In the para-
digmatic case, there must be a nexus between the misconduct of an impeach-
able official and the latter's official duties. It is this paradigm that Alexander 
Hamilton captured so dramatically in his suggestion that impeachable offenses 
derive from "the abuse or violation of some public trust" and are "of a nature 
which may be peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate 
chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself."97 This paradigm is 
also implicit in the founders' many references to abuses of power as constitut-
ing political crimes or impeachable offenses. The paradigm has come to be 
symbolized by the three articles of impeachment approved by the House Judi-
ciary Committee against Richard Nixon-charging obstruction of justice, abuse 
of powers and unlawful refusal to supply material subpoenaed by the House· of 
Representatives.98 These charges derived from Nixon's misuse of the powers 
and privileges of his office to facilitate his reelection and to hurt his political 
enemies as well as to frustrate or undermine inappropriately legitimate at-
tempts to investigate the extent of his misconduct. Nixon's misconduct effec-
tively disabled him from continuing to exercise the constitutional duties of his 
office. Keeping Nixon iri office would have countenanced serious breaches of 
the public trust and abuses .of power and substantially demeaned the office of 
the presidency. 
Many the House's decisions not to initiate impeachments nor to approve 
impeachment articles as well as ~e Senate's decisions to acquit are consistent 
with this paradigm. For example, the Senate failed to convict Associate Jus-
tice Samuel Chase in part because some members did not believe that the con-
duct, on which the House's charges had been based, rose to the level of im-
peachable offenses or could fairly be characterized as being the kinds of 
indiscretions or mistaken judgments that fall within the legitimate scope of a 
judge's authority.99 Similarly, the House voted 127-83 not to impeach Presi-
dent Tyler for abusing his powers based on his refusals to share with the 
House inside details on whom he considered nominating to various con-
firmable positions and his vetoing of a wide range of Whig-sponsored legisla-
tion. Tyler's attempts to protect and assert what he regarded as the preroga-
tives of his office were a function of his constitutional and policy judgments; 
they might have been wrong-headed or even poorly conceived (at least in the 
view of many Whigs in Congress), but they were not malicious efforts to abuse 
97. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 365 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 ). 
98. See HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD NIXON, 
H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
99. 8 ANNALSOFCONG. 669,728-31 (1803-1804). 
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or expand his powers, as was true in Richard Nixon's case, for purely personal 
gain or aggrandizement. The Senate also refused to convict Andrew Johnson 
by the slimmest of margins because a small but pivotal number of senators be-
lieved, among other things, that the charges brought by the House against him 
did not rise to the level of impeachable offenses and because Johnson's real 
"crimes" were mistaken or erroneous judgments rather than malicious abuses 
of power. The outcomes of the efforts to try to oust Presidents Tyler and John-
son confirm the suggestion made by Professors Peter Hoffer and N.E.H. Hall 
in their excellent study of the history of impeachment in the United States, that 
impeachable offenses are not "simply political acts obnoxious to the govern-
ment's ruling faction." 100 In this century, the House rejected then-
Representative Gerald Ford's resolution to initiate an impeachment action 
against Justice William 0. Douglas, at least in part because a majority of 
members were not persuaded that either Douglas' lifestyle or the substance or 
content of his decisionmaking was a relevant subject for an impeachment in-
quiry.101 Indeed, then-Representative Ford agreed in introducing his im-
peachment resolution against Justice Douglas that the standards for impeach-
ing judges and presidents are different and that presidents could be impeached 
and removed from office only for "great" and "dangerous" offenses. 102 
Moreover, the House Judiciary Committee refused to bring an article of im-
peachment against President Nixon based on fraud in preparing his taxes, at 
least in part because it was not the kind of misconduct that could only have 
been committed by a president because of the special office or trust he held. 103 
It is also fair to say that the vast majority of the impeachments that have 
been brought by the House and the convictions that have been rendered by the 
Senate follow the paradigmatic case. Most if not all of the officials impeached 
by the House104 and the seven officials convicted and removed by the Sen-
100. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 60, at 101. 
101. See generally, ASSOC. JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JU-
DICIARY, 9lst Cong., FINAL REPORT BY THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON H. RES. 920 (Comm. 
Print 1970) (investigating the charges against Justice Douglas). The special subcommittee con-
cluded that its investigation did "not disclose credible evidence that would warrant preparation of 
charges on any acceptable concept of an impeachable offense [against Justice Douglas]." ld. at 
349. 
I 02. See 116 CONG. REC. 11,912 ( 1970) (statements of Rep. Gerald Ford). 
103. See ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, supra note 98, at 105 (citing 
the "Proposed Article on Emoluments and Tax Evasion"). 
104. These officials include.the following: Senator William Blount (for engaging in conduct 
that not only undermined presidential authority and undermining the national government's rela-
tions with various Indian tributes but also acting in a manner "contrary to the duty of his trust ... 
in violation of the obligations of neutrality, and against the laws of the United States, and the 
peace and interests thereof'); Judge John Pickering (for making errors in conducting a trial in 
violation of his duty and trust and engaging in behavior on the bench unbecoming of a federal 
judge); Associate Justice Samuel Chase (for conducting himself on the bench "in a manner highly 
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ate105 were found to have misused their offices or their prerogatives or seri-
ously injured the republic by breaching the special trusts that they held by 
virtue of holding their federal offices. For example, in 1986, the House im-
peached and the Senate convicted and removed federal district judge Harry 
Claiborne from office based on income tax evasion. At first glance, it seems 
as if Claiborne's misconduct has no formal relationship to his official duties. 
Nevertheless, in impeaching and removing Claiborne, Congress reached the 
judgment that integrity is an indispensable criterion for someone to function as 
a federal judge. Moreover, as the House Report and subsequent Senate debate 
on Claiborne's impeachment reflected,106 the members of Congress concluded 
that commission of tax evasion robs a federal judge of the moral authority re-
quired to oversee the trials and sentencing of others for the very same offense. 
In other words, a federal judge must have integrity beyond reproach in order to 
perform the functions of his or her office. Incontrovertible proof that a federal 
judge lacks integrity effectively disables a federal judge completely from per-
forming his or her duties. 
There is no doubt that integrity is also important for a president (or, for 
that matter, any appointed or elected official) to do his job. There is also no 
doubt that demonstrated lack of integrity poses a problem for a president. 
Whether demonstrated abse1,1ce of integrity poses a problem of impeachable 
arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust"); Judge West Humphreys (for neglect of duty); President An-
drew Johnson (for violating the Tenure in Office Act and exercising his authority to interfere with 
the proper execution of the law); Judge Mark Delahay (for intoxication both on and off the 
bench); Secretary of War .Belknap (for r~ceiving an illegal payment in exchange for making a 
military appointment); Judge ·George English (for using his office for personal monetary gain); 
Judge James Peck (for vindictive use of power); Judge.Charles Swayne (for exercising his power 
maliciously and using his office for personal monetary gain); Judge Robert Archbald (for using 
his office for improper financial gain); Judge Harold Louderback (for using his office for im-
proper financial gain); Judge Halsted Ritter (for engaging in behavior that brought disrepute to 
the judiciary); Harry Claiborne (for income tax evasion); Alcee Hastings (for bribery); and Walter 
Nixon (for making false statements to a grand jury). See STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, 
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d Cong., REPORT ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR 
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 41-55 (Comrn. Print 1973) (discussing impeachment cases prior to 
1973); See MODERN PRECEDENTS, supra note 89, at 5-14 (discussing impeachment cases since 
1973). All seven convictions and removals made by the Senate have involved abuses of power 
and serious breaches of the public trust: Judge John Pickering (for drunkenness and senility); 
Judge Humphreys (for neglect of duty); Judge Archbald (for bribery); Judge Ritter (for engaging 
in misbehavior that brought the judiciary into disrepute); Judge Claiborne (for tax evasion); Judge 
Hastings (for conspiracy to solicit a bribe); and Judge Nixon (for making false statements to a 
grand jury). JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL, supra note 87, at 30. 
105. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. 
106. See generally Reams & Gray, supra note 89. Article IV of the Articles of Impeachment 
state that Judge Claiborne "betrayed the trust of the people of the United States and reduced con-
fidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary .... " See H.R. Res. 461, 99th Cong. 
(1986). 
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dimensions for a president depends on the circumstances giving rise to ques-
tions about the President's integrity. If a president were to commit perjury or 
to make false statements in a case unrelated to his actions or responsibilities as 
president, one must still ask whether this misconduct effectively robs him of 
all moral authority to continue to function as president. It is conceival:lle that a 
president who has had his integrity scrutinized in an election and nevertheless 
· been elected has achieved sufficient legitimacy to function as president and 
obviously not been completely disabled by the questions raised about his in-
tegrity. Under these circumstances, elections perform a check on presidential 
misconduct. Such a check does not exist with respect to misconduct by federal 
judges. The fact that such ratifying elections have occurred should be taken 
into account in calculating the magnitude of the offense committed and the 
magnitude of the harm resulting to the republic. 
A variation on this reasoning could be used to explain the House's im-
peachment and the Senate's conviction of Walter Nixon in 1989. Nixon was 
impeached and removed from his federal district judgeship for making false 
statements to a grand jury.'107 In a criminal trial, he had been convicted of 
making false statements to a grand jury about the efforts he had undertaken to 
influence a criminal prosecution of the son of a business partner. 108 Clearly, 
the misconduct alleged did not strictly relate to Nixon's formal actions as a 
federal judge (i.e., he was not necessarily functioning as a federal judge when 
talking with the state prosecutor about dropping the case.) Nevertheless, 
whatever influence Nixon had had available to exercise on behalf of his busi-
ness partner's son existed by virtue of the federal judgeship he held. Moreo-
ver, making false statements to a grand jury impugns a judge's integrity at 
least as much, if not more, than tax evasion (which involves the making of 
false statements under oath in a different manner.) Again, the House and the 
Senate each reasonably concluded that the demonstrated lack integrity robs a 
federal judge of the most important commodity he must have in order to per-
form his constitutional function. 109 Nixon's misconduct completely disabled 
him from continuing to function as a federal judge. 
107. See generally, MODERN PRECEDENTS, supra note 89, at 9-13 (discussing the impeach-
ment of Judge Nixon). 
108. See United States v. Nixon, 816 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming a jury trial convic-
tion), reh'g denied, 827 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1987), and cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988). 
109. "[T]he crime for which [Judge Nixon] was convicted, lying to a grand jury in testimony 
under oath, is particularly serious because a judge must bear the awesome responsibility of 
swearing witnesses, judging credibility, and finding truth in cases that come before him." See 
MODERN PRECEDENTS, supra note 89, at 10 (quoting Representative Don Edwards, who served 
as Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee's subcommittee that held hearings on Judge 
Nixon's impeachment and also as House manager in the subsequent Senate trial). 
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D. The Significance of Especially Outrageous or Incompatible Conduct. 
My understandings of Congress' impeachment decisions regarding Clai-
borne, if not those involving Walter Nixon, suggest that these decisions might 
also be understood as reflecting not an extension or variation of the paradigm 
for impeachment but rather the possible existence of yet another trend of im-
peachment proceedings in which the nexus between an official's J!risconduct 
and his or her official duties is not so clear. This latter circumstance consists 
of those cases in which the misconduct in which an impeachable official has 
engaged is so outrageous and so plainly incompatible with their status that 
Congress has no choice but to impeach and remove those officials from office. 
Congress could have decided that the misconduct for which it was impeaching 
and removing Claiborne Nixon was sufficiently outrageous or destructive of 
their capacities to function effectively as federal judges so as to justify their 
impeachments and removals from office. There is little doubt that Congress' 
perception that each judge had enga~ed in such outrageous misconduct had 
been reinforced by the facts that prior to both judges' impeachments they had 
been criminally prosecuted,· convicted, and imprisoned. Indeed, they were 
both continuing to receive their judicial salaries while incarcerated: This out-
rageous circumstance intensified the pressure placed on Congress to impeach 
the two federal judges. 
The possible existence of this second category of impeachable offenses 
helps to explain one of the most vexing hypotheticals, repeatedly raised in-
volving the impeachment process, namely whether a president may be im-
peached and removed from office for murder. The nexus between the presi-
dent's misconduct- murder- and his official duties (taking care to enforce the 
laws faithfully) is not readily apparent, for it is not clear that a President's oath 
obligates a President in h!s private capacity to comply with every single law, 
even those that he does not have the formal authority to enforce. Nevertheless, 
impeachment, in all likelihood, is appropriate. The best explanation why this 
is so was made by Professor Charles Black in his magnificent study of the im-
peachment process: 
Many common crimes - willful murder, for example - though not subversive 
of government or political order, might be so serious as to make a president 
simply unviable as a national leader; I cannot think that a president who had 
committed murder could not be removed by impeachment. But the underlying 
reason remains much the same; such crimes would so stain a president as to 
make his continuance in office dangerous to public order. 110 .. 
110. BLACK, supra note 55, at 39. It is noteworthy that Justice Story was uncertain about 
whether murder was an impeachable offense. He was not sur~;: about the validity of William 
Rawle's assertion that the "legitimate causes of impeachment ... have reference only to public 
character, and official duty .... In general, those offenses, which may be committed equally by a 
private citizen, as a public officer, are not the subjects of impeachment. Murder, burglary, rob-
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E. Alternative Means of Redress. 
Yet another pattern is the persistent recognition by Congress that its con-
stitutionally vested authority or power includes the discretion not to exercise 
the power or authority if it sees fit. In the realm of impeachment, the House 
has recognized that its "sole Power of Impeachment" 111 includes the discretion 
not to impeach an official even if a majority of its members thought or be-
lieved that the official had committed an impeachable offense or engaged in a 
misconduct that could reasonably be characterized as impeachable. Similarly, 
the Senate has the authority implicit within its "sole [p ]ower to try an Im-
peachment" 112 to decide not to convict or remove an official even if most if not 
all of its members believed the latter had committed an impeachable offense. 
In deciding whether to impeach or not, the House and the Senate each 
have the power to consider whether it (or some other official body) has avail-
able alternatives (or supplements) to impeachment. 113 One such alternative (or 
supplement) is censure. If one were to understand censure as consisting of 
nothing more than a resolution passed by the House or the Senate, it is plainly 
constitutional. 114 In my opinion, every conceivable source of constitutional 
bery, and indeed all offences not immediately connected with office [except treason and bribery] 
are left to the ordinary course of judicial proceeding .... " STORY, supra note 52,§ 801, at 585 
(quoting WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
215 (2d ed. 1829)). In other words, at least for Rawle, the impeachment process could only prop-
erly focus on those acts committed or performed by a president strictly in "his public character." 
2 JONATHAN ELLIOTT, THE DEBATE IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 480 (2d ed. 1907) (quoting from remarks of James Wilson in 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention). The distinction re~ognized by Justice Story between the 
public acts that provide appropriate bases for impeachment and the private conduct that does not 
is accepted by most impeachment scholars. The critical question has to do with what is the ap-
propriate dividing line between the two. Congress tends to answer this question on a case-by-
case basis. Even so, this distinction does help to·explain further why the House Judiciary Com-
mittee decided not to charge Richard Nixon with income tax fraud, why the House decided not to 
approve an impeachment inquiry of Justice William 0. Douglas based on his lifestyle or multiple 
marriages, and why Alexander Hamilton was never subjected to impeachment for having en-
gaged (by his own admission) in an adulterous affair with a married woman (whose husband then 
blackmailed Hamilton to keep the liaison secret.) The fact that Harry Claiborne and Walter 
Nixon each were impeached and removed for arguably private actions turns on appreciating that 
the felonies each committed effectively robbed each of the basic asset necessary to function as a 
federal judge-integrity-and thus disabled each from continuing to function as a federal judge. 
Ill. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
112. U.S. CONST, art. I,§ 3, cl. 6. 
113. See generally, Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits To Impeachment And Its 
Alternatives, 68 TEX. L. REV. I (1989). 
114. It is noteworthy that prior to the House's vote to impeach President Clinton, Representa-
tive William Delahunt (D.-Mass.) had sought the opinions regarding the constitutionality of cen-
sure of the nineteen constitutional scholars and historians who had testified on November 9, 
1998, before the House Subcommittee on the Constitution. Fourteen of the nineteen indicated that 
they thought censure was constitutional. Joan Biskupic, Many Scholars Say Centure Is an Op-
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authority-text, structure, and history-supports the legitimacy of the House's 
or the Senate's (or both's) passage of a resolution expressing its disapproval of 
the President's conduct. First, there are several textual provisions of the Con-
stitution confirming the House's authority to memorialize its opinions on pub-
lic matters. The Constitution both authorizes the House of Representatives to 
"keep a Journal of its Proceedings"115 and provides that "for any Speech or 
Debate in either House, [members] shall not be questioned in any other 
Place."116 One may plainly infer from these textual provisions the authority of 
the House or the Senate or both to pass a non-binding resolution in which each 
expresses its opinion-pro or con--on some public matter. 
Second, the passage of resolutions critical of a president is quite compati-
ble with the constitutional structure. The Constitution does not establish im-
peachment as the only constitutionally authorized means by which the House 
or the Senate may "censure" the President. Instead, impeachment exists as the 
only means by which the House may formally charge and thereby obligate the 
Senate to consider the removal of a president for certain kinds of misconduct. 
Removal and disqualification are the only sanctions that the Senate may im-
pose if it were to convict an impeached official at the end of an impeachment 
trial. 117 Otherwise, the constitutional structure leaves to the criminal process 
the investigation and punishment of all sorts of misconduct (some but not all 
of which might overlap with impeachable· misconduct) and to the political 
process-broadly understood-the checking or censure of misconduct of a 
wide variety (including but not limited to offenses that do not rise to the level 
of an impeachable offense). 
Moreover, it is nonsensical to think that ifa resolution has no legal effect 
it somehow still might violate the law. By definition, a resolution has no ef-
fect on the law (or legal arrangements) in any way. To think that a resolution 
might have little or no practical effect is not a reason to think that it is uncon-
stitutional; it is a reason to think perhaps that a resolution critical of the Presi-
dent might be a futile act politically. The calculation of whether a resolution is 
a worthwhile endeavor politically is separate and distinct from whether it is 
constitutional. 
In addition, the House and the Senate each have passed resolutions con-
demning or criticizing the misconduct of presidents and other high-ranking of-
ficials. Indeed, on at least two occasions, the House has memorialized its dis-
approval of presidential misconduct. The subjects of the latter resolutions 
tion; GOP Leaders Call It Unconstitutional but Historical Evidence Is Less Clear, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 15, 1998, at A19. 
115. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 5. 
116. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 6. 
117. U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 3. 
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were Presidents Polk118 and Buchanan. 119 Moreover, though the House had 
decided not impeach President Tyler for his exuberant exercises of his veto 
a~thority, the House did adopt a House Committee report that had been highly 
critical of President Tyler's exercise of his veto authority. 120 In addition, the 
Senate censured President Andrew Jackson for firing his Treasury Secretary 
because he refused to implement Jackson's instructions to withdraw national 
bank funds and to deposit them in state banks. 121 Such resolutions provide 
historical precedents for the House and the Senate to do something similar 
with respect to President Clinton (or any other official). For that matter, the 
thousands of resolutions that the House and the Senate each have passed over 
the years expressing its opinions on a wide variety of public matters constitute 
other relevant precedents supporting the House's or the Senate's passage of a 
resolution expressing its condemnation or disapproval of a Presiqent's con-
duct. (Indeed, the House has also passed at least three resolutions expressing 
its disapproval of conduct by high-ranking executive officials other than the 
President, while the Senate also passed two such resolutions in the 191h cen-
tury.)l22 
F. The Judgment of History. 
Yet another significant pattern in impeachment proceedings is that as the 
latter unfold members of Congress increasingly feel the pressure to find some 
non-partisan basis for their decisions that will withstand the test of time. This 
pressure cornes from the increasing awareness that the legitimacy of their deci-
sionmaking will depend largely on the judgment of history. In Federalist 
Number Sixty-Five, Alexander Hamilton warned that impeachments would 
often begin in a partisan atmosphere. 123 Consequently, Hamilton counseled, 
the further along an impeachment proceeded the more members of Congress 
needed to find a non-partisan basis on which to resolve the proceedings. The 
historical record is replete with senators who in the midst or near the end of 
impeachment trials expressed the awareness that their final decision to achieve 
legitimacy needed to withstand the test of time. As Senator William Fes-
senden commented near the end of President Andrew Johnson's trial, the bur-
118. Bruce Balestier, Censure Is Viable Alternative To Impeachment, City Bar Says, N.Y.L.J. 
Dec. 14, 1998, at 3. 
119. Sean Scully, Congress Censured Three Siting Presidents, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1999, at 
A9. 
120. Paul Finkelman, Letter to the Editor: .Censure-Constitutional and Appropriate, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 5, 1998, at A22. 
121. Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
United States House ofRepreseniatives, Associated Press Pol. Service, Dec. 9, 1998, available in 
1998 WL 7470314. 
122. See Scully, supra note 119. 
123. The Federalist No. 65, at 365 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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den was then on the Senate, given the partisan origins of the proceedings, to 
reach a judgment about which "all right thinking men" would agree. 124 This 
comment is consistent with not only many of the ratifiers' expectations about 
impeachment but also most subsequent scholars' and senators' perceptions of 
the very high threshold an impeachment decision must satisfy in order to be 
viewed historically as a legitimate exercise of Congress' impeachment power. 
CONCLUSION 
My sense of the history of the federal impeachment process, as reflected in 
the debates in the constitutional and state ratifying conventions and Congress' 
subsequent exercises of its impeachment authority, is that "other high crimes 
or misdemeanors" are technical terms of art that refer to so-called political 
crimes. Political crimes are abuses of power or the kinds of misconduct that 
· can only be committed by some public officials by virtue of the public offices 
or special trust that they hold. These political crimes are not necessarily in-
dictable offenses. Not all political crimes are indictable offenses, and not all 
indictable offenses are political crimes. 
Whether or not some misconduct by a public official is a political crime or 
rises to the level of an impeachable offense turns on a number of different 
factors. These factors are apparent from studying the constitutional and state 
ratifying convention debates as well as Congress' impeachment decisions and 
practices. These factors include but are not limited to the seriousness of the 
misconduct, its timing, the link between the misconduct and the official's offi-
cial responsibilities or special trust held by virtue of the positions held by the 
official, alternative means of redress, and the degree of injury caused to the 
public by the misconduct in question. 
Studying Congress' impeachment decisions also reveals some noteworthy 
patterns. Most if not all impeachments made by the House and convictions 
made by the Senate have followed or approximated the paradigm of an im-
peachment-the abuse of official power or privilege. In doing so, congres-
sional practices have been quite consistent with the framers' and ratifiers' 
statements and scholarly commentary recognizing impeachment as a unique 
component of the constitutional scheme of checks and balances. The Consti-
tution embodies the judgments that the judiciary and the President (as a sym-
bol of the executive branch) each need to be independent (to some meaningful 
degree) and possess the vitality and stature necessary to allow the judiciary 
and the President to act in their respective ways as checks on the national leg-
islature. In other words, congressional practices reflect the judgment that the 
Constitution envisions that impeachment should not be used to punish or re-
taliate against impeachable officials, such as the President and federal judges, 
124. See 144 CONG. REc. H11,968-03, H12,011 (Dec. 19, 1998). 
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because of their opinions, policy differences, or innocent errors of judgment. 
Nor should impeachment be used for largely partisan purposes; hence, some 
senators refused to convict Associate Justice Samuel Chase or President An-
drew Johnson for fear that if either were removed future presidents or judges 
from their party would likely be punished in the impeachment process just by 
virtue of their party affiliation. Rather, impeachment generally should be de-
ployed against impeachable officials for having engaged in some misconduct 
that (1) has caused some serious injury to the republic or to the constitutional 
system and (2) has a nexus with the official's formal duties. 
The one or at most two impeachments that do not fit neatly into the para-
digm-those of Harry Claiborne and Walter Nixon-might be explained in 
two ways. They could be explained on the grounds that integrity is the single 
most important asset that a federal judge needs to do his job and that demon-
strated lack of integrity robs a judge of the moral authority to continue to 
function and disables him completely from continuing to perform his constitu-
tional function. Alternatively, the Nixon and particularly the Claiborne im-
peachment could be explained as signaling the existence of a second category 
of offenses consisting of the kinds of misconduct that are so outrageous and so 
incompatible with the status or duties of the officials who have committed 
thein that Congress has no choice but to impeach and remove those officials. 
